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Peter J. Larkham
Replanning post-war Birmingham 
Process, product and longevity
Introduction
The city of Birmingham represents an important ex-
ample of major UK post-war replanning – the recon-
struction of large sections of the bombed city centre, 
an inner ring road permitted by a private Act of Parlia-
ment, and the continuation of large-scale slum clear-
ance and rebuilding conceived before the war – but all 
carried out by the staff of the (admittedly large) local 
authority without resorting to external consultants 
and apparently minimising the input of even local pro-
fessionals and concerned bodies. This was an internal 
expert-driven, paternalist, approach to planning. Yet 
no overall plan was ever produced for the city, or even 
for the city centre. Birmingham was not alone in this, 
although it was an unusual approach in British post-
war reconstruction. The key themes from this, which 
are widely applicable in UK and other reconstruction 
examples,1 include the top-down planning approach; a 
technocentrism which prioritised vehicle movement;2 
and a willingness to ignore any value in what had been 
damaged or destroyed: the modernist mind-set was 
dominant.
This is shown by enthusiastic promotional pieces 
in the press and professional journals. One rather 
exaggerated example suffices to demonstrate this 
civic boosterism and way of thinking: »Birmingham 
[…] is undergoing what is probably the biggest and 
boldest scheme of comprehensive redevelopment ever 
undertaken in this country. Radical urban renewal is 
taking place from the centre to the periphery […]. A 
new commercial centre worthy of the second city in 
the land is being created. A pattern of wide new streets 
is being imposed on the existing archaic road system 
[…]. Along the new frontages of the inner ring road, 
already under construction, developers are erecting 
buildings which will give to the principal shopping 
area something of the atmosphere of Regent Street 
while retaining the essential character of this thriving 
west midland city.«3 
It is appropriate to reassess Birmingham’s recon-
struction particularly since much research has been 
carried out on aspects of post-war reconstruction in the 
UK and other countries in recent years; and because 
the product of this reconstruction has been subject to 
critical reappraisal, demolition and replacement. The 
selected examples of process and product demonstrate 
the complexity and contradiction in restructuring a 
major city centre, and the quality of the resulting built 
environment. While Birmingham itself is not typical 
of the UK, the post-war reconstruction is everywhere 
being re-evaluated as it ages. Sustainability, and the 
longevity of the reconstruction landscape, are now 
dominant issues. 
The wartime damage
Damage in Birmingham was extensive, but widely 
scattered across the city rather than consisting of large 
areas of completely-demolished property (Fig. 1). 
Even so, 76 sites of over half an acre were »devas-
tated«.4 The two major inner-city areas were the Bull 
Ring/Market Hall, and the New Street/High Street 
corner known as the Big Top site (used for circus 
performances) (Fig. 2). The death toll was high for 
this early stage of the war: 2,227 were killed and 3,000 
seriously injured by mid-1941.5
1 See examples in Hein/Diefendorf/Yorifusa 2003; Düwel/
Gutschow 2013.
2 See Hendriks 1994 comparing car-dominated techno-
centrism and culture in Munich and Birmingham.
3 Architect & Building News 1959, 470.
4 Public Works Committee (PWC) report, 25/7/44, 480.
5 Sunday Mercury 11/11/1990.
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In early 1941 the Cabinet Committee on the Re-
construction of Town and Country decided to re-
view four sample heavily-bombed areas, and selected 
Birmingham, along with Coventry, Bristol and South-
ampton.6 Nevertheless the damage was insufficiently 
serious to qualify for special government approval for 
replacement retail and commercial development. In 
December 1946 the Public Works Committee (PWC) 
reported that 1,450 bombed properties had been 
demolished and 600 »dangerous properties« made 
safe; by March 1948 the number of demolitions had 
reached 6,985.7
Process
The administration of replanning
Many towns undertook a reconstruction and replan-
ning process at this time, whether bomb-damaged 
or not, often using external consultants to produce a 
plan. Birmingham did not, nor did it produce such a 
city-wide plan. »The Corporation wanted to avoid dis-
couraging developers by laying down a rigid planning 
scheme; it preferred to attract them to Birmingham 
by the implied offer of freedom to build what they 
liked, and then to persuade them to introduce modi-
fications into their schemes«.8 Its City Surveyor and 
Engineer Herbert Manzoni, a powerful and influential 
personality, was behind both decisions. Here, it is the 
influence of Manzoni and other professional officers, 
the elected members acting as Committee chairs, and 
the developers and their architects that was signifi-
cant: an important example of agents and agency in 
reconstruction.9 Like many, Birmingham appointed 
a Reconstruction Committee, although in practice 
its influence on physical urban reconstruction was 
minimal. It also appointed advisory groups including 
representatives from interested organisations outside 
the council itself.
6 The National Archives (TNA) HLG 71/1570.
7 PWC Minutes 9/3/1948.
8 Sutcliffe/Smith 1974, 443.
9 This discussion is extended in Larkham 2014.
2. Birmingham, Market Hall
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Manzoni and the myth and contradictions  
of reconstruction
At the same time that the PWC was explicitly con-
sidering ›reconstruction‹, Manzoni gave a forthright 
interview to the Birmingham Mail. He stated clearly 
that »we have not got to start replanning Birmingham. 
All we want is the opportunity to carry out the plans 
we have already«. He was asked whether the bomb 
damage had altered those plans, and the succinct reply 
was »no«. Damage was far from a »clean sweep« and 
so »any dream that a completely new city can emerge, 
Phoenix-like […] is quite erroneous«.10 In taking this 
view Manzoni was clearly at odds with a number of 
other professionals in the UK, for whom the bomb 
damage was »the new opportunity« for large-scale re-
planning.11 In some cases there seemed to be a tabula 
rasa mentality, although Manzoni and a few others 
were far more realistic.
To Manzoni, therefore, the relatively limited and 
scattered nature of the damage, and the existence of a 
range of plans and ambitions dating to zoning in 1913 
and road plans of 1919 meant that Birmingham had 
no need for a ›reconstruction plan‹. He had already 
identified five slum clearance areas, which became the 
main focus for rebuilding, together with the inner ring 
road: ideas which predated the bombing.12 He also 
commented that, when the 1944 Town and Country 
Planning Act was passed, »we in Birmingham were 
ready, because our plans had already been drawn up 
in detail, and we took advantage of these powers« to 
acquire the five redevelopment areas. »Other cities 
had not been so well prepared as we were, and this 
is why we were the only ones to acquire such large 
areas at this time«.13 To a great extent the city was 
ready because of Manzoni’s contacts and influence 
at the national level, not solely because of the pre-
war planning. He said that Birmingham was ready 
»because we’d shaped the legislation for it, or at least 
we had been there while it was being shaped«.14 By 
»we« Manzoni meant himself. Few cities were as well 
prepared.
But Manzoni was not in favour of an all-encom-
passing reconstruction plan, as many other cities were 
preparing at that time. Until he left office in 1963 he 
felt that they were »often obsolete by the time they 
were put into effect«, an opinion strengthened by 
his experiences with the city’s civic centre proposals 
dating from the 1920s.15 In the light of this view, it 
is interesting that, in a later paper on reconstruction 
to the Town Planning Institute, he should quote the 
American planner Daniel Burnham: »Make no little 
plans. They have no magic to stir men’s blood, and 
probably themselves will not be realized. Make big 
plans, aim high in hope and work […]«.16
Other personalities
Some of the replanning and the subsequent recon-
struction – its nature, timing and extent – was heavily 
dependent upon personalities. Manzoni’s personal 
influence was clearly pivotal; but he recognised that 
»the influence of officialdom in town-planning in 
Birmingham has been very considerable, but from 
time to time there have been individuals who have 
played a very big part in initiating important ideas«.17 
The Town Clerk, Sir Frank Wiltshire, promoted 
the idea of seeking Parliamentary approval for the 
various proposals, to avoid the need for »detailed 
step-by-step approvals from the various Ministries 
when the work came to be carried out«.18 In retro-
spect this was a wise suggestion, despite the workload 
imposed.
Jack Cotton was a powerful influence. Birming-
ham born and educated, he operated a small estate 
agency from 1924 but was involved in major projects 
locally, nationally and internationally in the 1950s. 
In Birmingham his property company, City Centre 
Properties, became involved in a surprising number 
and size of projects. Many of these developments 
were designed by his own in-house architects, Cot-
ton, Ballard & Blow. Although he had developed a 
large office block in Waterloo Street in the late 1930s 
that is sometimes described as his ›headquarters‹, his 
operation has also been described as being managed 
with »a disarming naivety«: in the post-war period 
10 Birmingham Mail 27/2/1941.
11 For example Tubbs 1942, 21; although even Manzoni used 
the term (Manzoni 1941).
12 For example Manzoni 1955, 90.
13 Manzoni 1968, 2.
14 Interviewed by A. Sutcliffe 1967 –1969, transcript in Bir-
mingham Library.
15 Sutcliffe/Smith 1974, 448.
16 Manzoni 1955, 92.
17 Sutcliffe 1967 –1969.
18 Borg 1973, 54.
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at least, despite increasingly working at a national 
scale, Cotton »ran his show with two typists, an 
accountant, some clerks and a set of files he kept on 
the spare bed in his room at the Dorchester Hotel«.19 
The scale of his involvement in Birmingham is shown 
by the local references to Birmingham »B.C.«, i.e. 
»before Cotton«.20
Frank Price is an equally significant character. 
He stood for the Council in 1949 aged 27, became 
PWC chairman in 1954 and Lord Mayor in 1964/65. 
He was closely involved in the various negotiations 
to promote development sites, attract developers, 
lever funding from central government, and his 
personal influence underpinned the PWC’s deci-
sions through a crucial few years. He was always 
aware of his upbringing in the city’s inner slums, 
and he was abrasive and outspoken.21 But his some-
times unorthodox approaches did get things done 
where traditional ›civil service‹ approaches had 
failed: his contribution therefore requires serious 
consideration.
In Birmingham, therefore, powerful personali-
ties clearly played a significant part in shaping the 
reconstruction. Manzoni had started planning for 
slum reconstruction early, but distrusted city-scale 
master plans; he managed to influence the provisions 
of the 1944 Act to the city’s advantage; he was pro-
fessionally very well connected, tended to work well 
with his committee chairmen, and had a personal air 
of authority and confidence. He could make plans, 
but not even he could secure rationed construction 
materials so here, as virtually everywhere, the real 
rebuilding began some five years after the war and 
well over a decade since the first plans were made. 
Price pushed for, and achieved, construction; but his 
abrasive personal style caused some problems. What 
was actually achieved by the combination of Man-
zoni and Price was looked at askance by some of the 
younger post-war commentators. In preparing early 
for his retirement, and appointing Sheppard Fidler as 
the first City Architect,22 Manzoni found that he had 
to work closely with one of these younger critics. The 
personal styles, values and attitudes of these two did 
not work well together, and Sheppard Fidler also had 
problems with local politicians advocating speed and 
volume of housebuilding, whereas he tried to promote 
design quality.
Product
The ring road as a frame for redevelopment
Rapidly-changing technology, especially for transport 
and communications, shaped many reconstruction 
ideas at this time. Ring roads became popular, and 
Birmingham became widely known for its adoption 
of an ›armature‹ of civil engineering solutions – roads, 
flyovers and tunnels and a series of ring roads. The 
inner ring road provided not just a physical frame for 
the city core, constricting its growth, but conveniently 
also forms a frame for thinking about the process of 
reconstruction.23 
Manzoni reported on »central city planning« to the 
PWC, focusing on a ring road, in 1941.24 One of the 
aims was to extend the area of the city centre, although 
a major design consideration for the road line was 
that no point within the centre would be more than 
300 yards from the ring road, where bus stops and 
car parks would be concentrated: this was felt to be 
a reasonable distance to expect people to walk. »The 
intention was that people should not bring their cars 
into the city centre«.25 So the ring road had several 
apparent functions: to make adequate provision for 
what was already recognised as a major issue for the 
future, the rise of the private motor car; to assist in 
the traffic management of the city centre by diverting 
through traffic, providing parking places and bus sta-
tions; and it would delimit the city core. It is highly 
likely that a ring road would have been designed even 
without the impetus of bomb damage; however, the 
existence of bombed sites, together with the 300-yard 
walking radius, identified the line of the road as orig-
inally proposed. The PWC approved Manzoni’s ideas 
in principle on 29 April 1943.
In July 1945 the full Council authorised the promo-
tion of a Parliamentary Bill. It was the largest such lo-
cal authority scheme to have come before Parliament 
but faced no significant technical objections, although 
issues of compulsory purchase and compensation were 
19 Harwood 2002, 59.
20 Cited in his obituary: Time 3/4/1964.
21 Price 2002.
22 Larkham 2018.
23 Altrock/Fischer forthcoming 2018.
24 Manzoni 1941.
25 Manzoni 1968, 3.
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debated. This became the Birmingham Corporation 
Act 1946, and gave powers for the road’s construction 
and the compulsory acquisition of property (Fig. 3). 
The Council was anxious to acquire freeholds lining 
the street due to the control that landownership would 
bring.
The route was selected »as far as possible to avoid 
the most valuable property, and advantage was taken 
of sites where the buildings had been destroyed or 
damaged«.26 Of note is the north-south link road and 
the widening of Colmore Row running east-west: 
this scheme was far more than a simple ›ring road‹. 
Colmore Row was not part of the original proposals, 
but was added at a late stage and was to be widened 
to 120 feet, taking a large section of the Cathedral 
graveyard.27 The whole road would be »a city street 
of novel character – it is not an urban motorway, nor 
principally a traffic street or a shopping street«.28
The plan changed considerably over time. The 
bombed Market Hall caused particular debate. The 
1946 Act map shows the Market Hall demolished, 
but this was probably changed soon after »because 
of opposition from the market traders«.29 One of the 
earliest, but undated, views of the ring road (Fig. 4) 
suggests that both New Street Station and the Market 
Hall would be repaired, and that the ring road would 
swing in front of the station entrance and north of the 
26 Manzoni 1961, 268.
27 Borg 1973, 57.
28 Manzoni 1961, 267.
29 Ross, Estates Officer, interviewed in Sutcliffe 1967 –1969.
3. Original planned route of Ring Road, showing land purchase requirements
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Market Hall, with a central reservation stopping direct 
north-south traffic movement. The traditional design 
of the new buildings in this view is noteworthy.
Despite the powers acquired by the 1946 Act, 
the project was delayed by the post-war economic 
policies of successive governments. »Treasury fund-
ing was obtained only after the Corporation put up 
a stiff fight for what they rightly considered to be a 
vitally important road«.30 The Minister visited Bir-
mingham in February 1956 to inspect the proposals 
and the planning application was approved in May. 
The Minister was persuaded to approve funding for 
the scheme in January 1957.31 The road »was pushed 
ahead by the buccaneering, hard-headed officials and 
councillors«, probably a reference to Frank Price’s 
determined lobbying (»bullying« according to Price) 
of the Minister.32
At the start of construction, a redesigned road 
layout passed close on either side of the repaired 
Market Hall, leaving an elongated and awkward-
ly-sloping island. At the same time, a sketch of what 
became Smallbrook Ringway (Fig. 5) showed bulky 
and boxy buildings on the north (left-hand) side, but 
the cinema had survived (right-hand side). The left-
hand building, always planned as a hotel, would be 
built in different form in 1960 –1962, designed by J. 
A. Roberts as the Albany, »the most luxurious hotel 
to be built at the time outside London«, although 
double glazing had to be installed soon after first 
occupation because of the traffic noise.33 A report 
suggested that Roberts was designing Europe’s tallest 
building for the central site for Property & General 
Investments Ltd, containing shops, a bank, a restau-
rant, car parks and flats. In an interesting perspective 
on the contemporary planning process, it was noted 
that »no detailed plans have been presented to the 
4. Early perspective of Ring Road showing retention of Market Hall
30 Architect & Building News 1959, 472.
31 Birmingham City Council 1956, 57.
32 Marriott 1967, 223; Price 2002.
33 Marriott 1967, 223.
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public works committee, although it has approved 
the development«.34 This did not go ahead, and Seif-
ert & Partners designed an office podium and tower 
there in 1972 –1975.
Construction of the road itself began in 1957. The 
first section, Smallbrook Ringway, was opened in 
1960. This section was raised above natural ground 
level, with car parks underneath the carriageway. But 
developers and retailers proved difficult to attract 
to sites fronting the proposed ring road but outside 
the traditional city core. Three large sites advertised 
in 1957 produced only three responses; one, from 
John Laing & Son, working with the developer Jo 
Godfrey, proposed to redevelop the entire three 
sites. The Council agreed, stipulating only that retail 
units should be let to Council nominees, and that the 
scheme should include a hotel.35 The south side was 
designed by J. A. Roberts as a sinuous, narrow office 
block with ground-floor shops (Fig. 6). The narrow-
ness was forced by the limited land available through 
the compulsory purchase scheme.
Godfrey also responded to the advertisement of 
a site at Moor Street/Bull Ring on which the PWC 
wished to see a multi-storey car park with some shops 
and offices. Godfrey’s proposal would deliver that, to-
gether with shops within the subway linking that site 
to the city core, and development on a city-centre site 
adjoining the end of that subway. The latter became 
the Rotunda, a cylindrical office block, an icon of 
the rebuilt city. The PWC agreed to these innovative 
proposals and to granting a 99-year, rather than the 
usual 75-year, lease.36 The original designs for the Ro-
tunda were for only twelve storeys, with an equally 
high rectilinear building adjoining it on New Street. 
It eventually had 21 storeys, a bank, 100,000 sq ft of 
offices, and a revolving restaurant (never used).
The phasing of the ring road construction changed 
(Fig. 7), as did the detailed design of the road; and 
5. Early perspective of hotel on Smallbrook Ringway
34 Architect & Building News 16/11/1960, 614.
35 PWC Minutes 5/11/1957.
36 PWC Minutes 4/11/1958.
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6. Early model of Smallbrook Ringway, with sinuous narrow office block and hotel
7. Ring road phasing
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the development of commercial and retail buildings 
fronting the street was dropped. Price claims that 
he had realised that the frontage buildings were 
»wrong« but that there was no time to change plans 
before getting authorisation for the first phase; »then 
I had time to look at the plans. Then I began to see 
the defects of the scheme, in particular, at the Market 
Hall roundabout«.37 Once the Market Hall had gone, 
however, it was felt that requesting to alter the road 
line and elongated roundabout »would have meant an 
interminable discussion with the Ministry and in con-
sequence long delays«:38 so the roundabout remained, 
thus shaping the Bull Ring shopping centre design. A 
Government ban on new office building was extended 
to Birmingham in 1965 and this ended the local de-
velopment boom.39 Hence, as early as 1968, Manzoni 
noted that in contrast with the Smallbrook Ringway 
section, »other stretches of the road may not produce 
such a big return«.40
In 1971 the proposal to widen Colmore Row as 
part of the ring road scheme was dropped. The critic 
Ian Nairn had referred to this as »disastrous«.41 By 
the late 1960s the economic climate had changed, and 
some Councillors felt that the imminent completion 
of the ring road would provide sufficient traffic capac-
ity. Moreover, a new public and professional ethos was 
evident particularly following the Civic Amenities 
Act 1967: this highlighted the growing influence of 
the conservation movement. The whole ring road was 
officially opened by the Queen on 7 April 1971. By 
then the land cost had risen from £12 to £21 million 
and the construction cost from £2.5 to £13.25 million, 
and by 1973, capital investment in new buildings in the 
central area totalled over £200 million.42
Related to the ring road development, and equally 
technocentric, were proposals for underground traffic 
links, servicing and rapid transit. There was some dis-
cussion of an underground system in the immediate 
post-war years, as when the PWC decided that the 
costs of building one to the north-east of the city cen-
tre were uneconomic.43 A populist polemic discussed 
east-west and north-south tunnels under the city core. 
Oddly they appear to intersect at an underground 
cross-roads (Fig. 8).44 Finally, there was pressure to 
extend the Big Top development’s underground ser-
37 Sutcliffe 1967 –1969.
38 Price 2002,158.
39 Marriott 1967, 183.
40 Manzoni 1968, 3.
41 Nairn 1960, 114.
42 Borg 1973, 53, 71.
43 PWC Minutes 27/7/1948, 881.
44 Cadbury 1952.
8. Proposed road tunnel
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vice road the length of New Street, using the fall of 
land to the south to gain access. In the mid-1960s these 
ideas were promoted by the Leader of the Council, 
and the PWC approved in principle a service tunnel 
under New Street.45
The city-centre reconstruction
As the city’s bomb damage was insufficient to draw 
in significant central government support, the Council 
needed to attract businesses, and felt that a redevelop-
ment plan for the city centre would be seen as restric-
tive and counter-productive: their landholding could 
exert sufficient control while implying freedom to 
prospective occupiers.46 Manzoni, of course, disliked 
such plans too. Nevertheless, a range of interesting 
ideas developed early in the planning process. In 
October 1941 the PWC noted in general terms that 
air raid damage gives »an opportunity to effect many 
improvements of a local character [and] to make good 
many defects of the past«.47 Despite this planning 
activity at the local level, actual reconstruction was 
very limited in the early post-war years. Building 
materials were still rationed, and structural steel was 
made available to bomb-damaged cities as a result of 
a rationing process with Ministerial involvement.48 It 
was not until late 1949, after pressure from MPs rep-
resenting bombed towns, that government announced 
that rebuilding »could not be indefinitely deferred, 
and had decided that a start should be made with the 
rebuilding of central areas in the heavily bombed cities 
where plans were sufficiently far advanced«.49
The first sizeable post-war office block was de-
signed and built by Cotton, Ballard & Blow, fronting 
the line of the future inner ring road but not part of 
that project (Fig. 9).50 Cotton apparently received 
permission to build it despite the building restric-
tions, because he had secured the Ministry of Works 
as a tenant. The building is described as »a gaunt 
and graceless hulk« but it survives and has just been 
refurbished.51 The same company was also involved 
with an office development on New Street, for Shell-
Mex BP, built 1951–1953 (Fig. 10).52 The first designs 
were equally plain but, although the application was 
9. The former Severn House, the first sizeable post-war 
office block in the city, by Cotton, Ballard & Blow
10. Grosvenor House, New Street, by Cotton,  
Ballard & Blow
45 Lewis 1968.
46 Sutcliffe/Smith 1974, 442 – 443.
47 PWC Minutes 23/10/1941 (and see note 11).
48 See Flinn 2013.
49 Estates Gazette 25/9/1949, 236; NA HLG 71/2222.
50 Planning application 01538000, approved 23/12/1948.
51 Marriott 1967, 136.
52 Planning application 00816000, approved 26/5/1949.
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approved, Manzoni asked for »some improvement in 
the architectural treatment«. The result is »flashy but 
undeniably effective«.53 This building is now Listed.54
The Big Top site was rebuilt in 1956 –1961. Again 
designed by Cotton, Ballard & Blow, this was the 
first major development within the ring road line. 
Although this was a commercial venture by Raventop 
Developments, the Council had agreed to pay for an 
underground service vehicle access from the inner ring 
road. When redeveloped, the site produced »some of 
the most valuable shops in the country-retailers in the 
best pitch in Birmingham take as much money per 
square foot as in almost any street in Europe«.55
But professional ideas were changing, and Shep-
pard Fidler strongly argued in various widely reported 
meetings against buildings lining main roads (includ-
ing the inner ring road), and instead recommended 
pedestrian precincts and towers within city centres.56 
Many of these ideas were evident in contemporary 
architectural publications and in other rebuilt cit-
ies, although relatively few actually found place in 
Birmingham. They were present in the proposals by 
the Corporation Street Estates Co. to build shops 
and an office block. The scheme had been modified 
to include a ›raised shopping floor‹ with bridges over 
intervening streets. When built the segregation was 
achieved through underpasses (since removed). But 
at this time the city’s Estates Officer was seeking to 
develop a shopping arcade east of, and parallel with, 
Corporation Street. He complained that »nobody 
knew of my plans, and the pedestrian subways built 
in connection with the Bull Street and Corporation 
Street improvements do not correspond with the exits 
of my arcade«.57 Clearly there was a communication 
problem within the Council. These ideas were also 
evident in the 1962 plan for several blocks along Cor-
poration Street. A series of controversial proposals 
from at least 1959 suggested the replacement of the 
11. Civic Centre new layout, 1958, by Sheppard Fidler
53 Foster 2005, 111.
54 Placed on a Government list for protection.
55 Marriott 1967, 136 –137.
56 Sheppard Fidler 1959.
57 Sutcliffe 1967 – 69.
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late-Victorian blocks on the corner of New Street 
and Corporation Street. The most developed of these 
suggested a 14-storey office tower and »broad shop-
ping precincts, untroubled by traffic and reached by 
escalators from street level«, in a scheme proposed by 
Raventop Developments. It had »intricate low-rise 
courtyard planning« as well as the office tower.58 
Land Securities had purchased or acquired interests in 
a series of street-blocks in this part of the city centre. 
Early models show tower and slab blocks, with a fly-
over or elevated block linking both sides of Corpora-
tion Street. The same developers proposed a scheme of 
shops and a multi-storey car park on the opposite side 
of Corporation Street, with both developments linked 
by an extension of the underground service road from 
the ring road to the Big Top site.59 The total scheme 
would cost some £10 million, and the architect Walter 
Gropius had been involved in the design.60 This was 
a novel development form; the beginning of a trend 
towards precinct design. Although the Press comment 
was very positive, this scheme was never built.
Sheppard Fidler had produced a campus-style 
new masterplan for the 1920s Civic Centre area in 
1958 (Fig. 11). Baskerville House, begun before the 
war, would be completed, but all new civic functions 
would be in new, modern-styled buildings in a largely 
rectilinear layout (except for the projecting concert 
hall and auditorium, reminiscent of Coventry’s first 
layout for rebuilding). Most of the office functions in 
the complex would now be housed in four tall, linked 
tower blocks facing the canal. By this time, modernist 
precinct designs were dominating design thinking: 
new buildings and the spaces around them paid little 
or no heed to existing streets and street-block patterns, 
and this can be seen even more clearly in some of the 
city core designs of the following decade. The tradi-
tional urban model of buildings lining streets – seen 
so clearly in the Smallbrook Ring Road phase – had 
been replaced.
However, by 1965 Sheppard Fidler’s masterplan 
was itself out of favour, superseded by a much revised 
plan by his replacement, J. R. Sheridan-Shedden, and 
local architect John Madin. The four office towers had 
become municipal flats, and the plan included a 460-
foot column with a revolving restaurant, a monorail 
station, and the cost was over £8 million.61
By this time the new central library had taken vir-
tually its final form as an inverted stepped pyramid 
(Fig. 12). The John Madin Design Group had been ap-
pointed to design this in 1964, when Sheppard Fidler’s 
box was rejected. The library and its associated 
facilities had a long gestation, and the original crisp 
architectural form became cluttered by the proximity 
of other buildings. The structure was determined 
to a large extent by the column spacing needed for 
a proposed bus station on the ring road underneath 
the library itself. The original complex, including the 
bus station, was left incomplete after the onset of the 
oil crisis of the 1970s. Moreover, largely for reasons 
of cost, Madin’s original vision of a building faced 
in travertine marble, set in landscaped gardens with 
fountains and waterfalls, was altered, and pre-cast 
concrete cladding panels were used. The unique li-
brary has recently been demolished (Fig. 13).62
Not long after the start of the library project there 
was a more significant redesign of the south-eastern 
part of the civic centre, and the site was to be leased 
to ATV (Associated Television). Television production 
facilities would be built, together with office buildings 
(Fig. 14), but an exhibition hall would still be part of 
the site – but it was described as loss-making, »foisted 
upon ATV by the City Corporation as a condition in 
12. John Madin (second from right) and others reviewing 
an early model of the Library (Madin archive)
58 Foster 2005, 33.
59 Birmingham Post 20/7/1962.
60 Guardian 20/7/1962.
61 Architect & Building News 26/5/1965, 976; Guardian 
26/5/1965.
62 Clawley 2015; Larkham/Adams 2016.
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the lease of the magnificent site«.63 Madin felt that the 
lease to ATV had »wrecked the whole scheme« for the 
civic centre.64 The office towers at this development, 
named Paradise Circus, were designed by Seifert & 
Partners, although only one, Alpha Tower, was built 
(it is now Listed). The second block was replaced by 
a much more rectilinear hotel block set further back 
from the ring road.
Modernism was also most plainly evident on 
Colmore Circus, part of the inner ring road cross, in 
Kelly & Surman’s Lloyd House (1963, eleven storeys) 
and Madin’s Post & Mail building (1965, demolished 
2005). This was, although alien in its scale and form, 
regarded by architects as »the finest commercial build-
ing of its time in the city«.65
A three-acre street block fronting Corporation 
Street and the inner ring road cross was designed by 
Frederick Gibberd as a £2 million pedestrian shopping 
precinct over a car park. The client was Colonnade 
Developments, a company owned jointly by Ra-
venseft Properties and Cotton’s City Centre Prop-
erties. Although the shops were of 2/3 storeys, there 
was no office accommodation above them, owing to 
the saturation of the city’s office market and concerns 
over streets becoming »concrete canyons«.66 The Col-
onnade development is seen as »Birmingham’s best 
1960s shopping development« and is characterised 
by a solid Portland stone façade with unusual thin 
vertical slit windows.67 It is currently threatened by 
redevelopment, temporarily reprieved by the global 
economic situation.
13. Demolition of central library, 2016
63 Architect & Building News 11/9/1968, 54.
64 Sutcliffe 1967 –1969.
65 Foster 2005, 92.
66 Architect & Building News 30/10/1961, 682.
67 Foster 2005, 102.
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Also on Corporation Street is an eight-storey 
department store. Designed by T. P. Bennett & Sons 
and built in 1957 –1961, this represented a deliberate 
attempt by the city, and Price in particular, to attract 
major retailers. Price had been approached by the 
chairman of Harrod’s, who was interested in Broad 
Street. No site was quite suitable, but the Rackham’s 
site in the city core was, if it could be redeveloped in 
conjunction with an adjacent site owned by the coun-
cil. So Harrod’s acquired Rackham’s. »Having landed 
Harrod’s, I hoped the news would bring in many 
other quality stores which had yet to be represented in 
the city and would help our plans towards expanding 
the size and quality of the central shopping district«.68 
However, a week before the new store was opened, 
Harrod’s was taken over by House of Fraser, who 
retained the Rackham’s brand in Birmingham.
Again in the early 1960s, discussions were well 
advanced on the redevelopment of two other areas as 
distinct ›precincts‹ within the inner ring road. Both 
resulted in various proposals and architectural models, 
but neither was implemented. The sites were Temple 
Row, facing the Cathedral, and a site between the ring 
road and Corporation Street, for a development of law 
courts. Several Modernist proposals were drawn up 
for a legal precinct (Fig. 15).69 New Law Courts were 
eventually built, but not until the 1980s.
The bomb-damaged New Street Station was eventu-
ally redeveloped, although more as part of the broader 
14. ›ATV site‹ with Siefert’s towers
68 Price 2002, 154.
69 Photographs of several models exist in the City Archives, 
Box 22/67.
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upgrading and electrification of the West Coast Main 
Line than as a direct response to damage. The main 
entrance was aligned towards the ring road, with all 
services being at ground level and platforms below 
ground, supported by over 200 concrete columns. The 
work began in 1964 and the whole £4.5 million station 
was opened on 6 March 1967.70 Above the station it-
self a further 7.5-acre concrete raft supported a new 
shopping centre by Cotton, Ballard & Blow, costing a 
further £6 million and built in 1968 –1970. Also asso-
ciated with this scheme was a 21-storey block of flats, 
a multi-storey car park and a nine-storey office block. 
Interestingly a futuristic 1952 illustration (Fig. 16) is 
a more ›urban‹ development, with longer built-up 
active street frontages.71 The station and its shopping 
centre have recently been substantially upgraded, with 
a cloud-like mirror cladding.
Mention should also be made of the massive un-
derground system of the Anchor Exchange and its 
accesses and services – a further technocentric project. 
This was one of three national communications hubs 
designed to be nuclear bomb proof. It was built in 
the mid-1950s under a cover story of constructing an 
underground rail system. This system lies between the 
telecommunications tower and the central library. Its 
technology soon became obsolete and was declassified 
in 1967. Although part used for other telecommuni-
cations purposes, it has been badly affected by rising 
groundwater levels and is now considered unsafe.72
15. Law Courts precinct model, September 1962
70 McKenna 2005, 133.
71 Cadbury 1952, 56.
72 www.birminghamuk.com; www.birminghamanchor.
co.uk.
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16. Impression of New Street station redevelopment (not implemented)
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The Bull Ring
The area around the bombed Market Hall – the Bull 
Ring – was the historic site of city markets. By 1959 
the PWC held a conference to discuss the area. A 
key consideration was the Ministry of Transport’s 
preference that vehicular roads should be separated 
from pedestrian routes.73 Despite earlier plans and a 
recent booklet,74 this meeting agreed to demolish the 
Market Hall.75 Price said that »the original plans had 
been changed to preserve the Market Hall […] I got 
the Council to agree to the demolition of the Market 
Hall, in the face of quite strong opposition from those 
who believed that it had some architectural interest«.76 
Shortly afterwards Godfrey approached the PWC 
proposing, on this now extensive redevelopment site, 
a large covered shopping centre, bus station, car park 
etc., to be designed by J. A. Roberts. His ideas aligned 
with those of the City Architect.77
However, at this time there were changes of Coun-
cil officers and Committee members; and the Council 
established the principle that sites for lease should be 
17. Late aerial perspective of the Bull Ring (artist unknown) 
73 Foster 2005, 85.
74 Birmingham City Council 1956 –1957.
75 PWC Minutes 6/1/1959.
76 Sutcliffe 1967 –1969; see also Price 2002, 157 – 58. In con-
trast, Harwood 2002, 62 asserts that it was Godfrey who 
persuaded the Council to demolish the Market Hall, but 
gives no source.
77 Marriott 1967, 224.
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advertised rather than negotiated.78 Ross, the Estates 
Officer, opposed the relatively low ground-rents sug-
gested by the then-preferred developers and this was 
influential. Godfrey offered £50,000 per year; Ross 
wanted £75,000.79 The site was advertised to devel-
opers by public tender. The specification left a great 
deal to potential developers: »since Birmingham […] 
had not done any serious research on the potential of 
the Bull Ring site as a shopping centre, it was wise to 
leave the decision to somebody else«.80 The selected 
developer – the Laing Investment Co. – bid an annual 
ground rent of £109,000 and produced a design similar 
to Roberts’s for Godfrey, but using different archi-
tects: a process criticised at the time.81 Ross said that 
»We did not accept the highest bid […] we accepted 
[Laing’s] because we knew that Laing’s were a good 
firm«.82 This became the Bull Ring shopping centre 
(Fig. 17), on which work began in 1961. The scheme 
cost some £8 million,83 and included 350,000 square 
feet of retail floorspace, the retail market, a 500-space 
car park, a seven-storey office block, and a bus station 
designed to handle 18 million passengers per year. The 
ring road cut through the site, but shoppers inside the 
centre passed over it by corridors and escalators, or 
under it via shop-lined underpasses, hardly aware of 
it. The island site formerly occupied by the Market 
Hall was partly an area for market stalls and partly 
landscaped public open space (later named Manzoni 
Gardens). But the centre was initially difficult to let, 
its technology was unreliable, by the 1980s there were 
discussions about redevelopment, and it was demol-
ished by 2000.
Conclusions
It is difficult to present a coherent picture of post-war 
redevelopment in a city as large as Birmingham, where 
bomb damage was severe but at the same time diffuse, 
and where no single coherent reconstruction plan was 
ever formulated. This overview of a sample of projects 
unpacks the complexity and contradiction of process, 
and the nature, quality and longevity of the product. 
This was authoritarian, top-down development, 
shaped by key personalities:
›Planning‹ was virtually absent at least strategi-
cally. In thematic terms, it is difficult to separate 
consideration of roads – important as these are in 
Birmingham’s rebuilding – from that of the buildings 
lining them. In Birmingham, the debate over shallow 
and long blocks, or deep blocks, lining the ring road 
was significant and was shaped in part by finance and 
the hurry to gain Parliamentary approval. Although 
new roads create a new morphological frame, there 
is great persistence of plan: in terms of the remnants 
of existing morphological frames,84 and indeed of the 
infrastructures underneath roads to be removed.
The extent of ›reconstruction‹
In Birmingham, as elsewhere, the professional view 
was taken that bombing provided an opportunity for 
redevelopment: pre-war plans could be implemented, 
and pre-war ideas and aspirations were developed 
into implementable form. Once materials and finance 
became available – and there was over a decade of 
delay with this – then redevelopment proceeded 
rapidly, principally because plans were in place, and 
because of the decision to seek a private Act. The Act 
provided compulsory purchase powers and the nec-
essary permission. Ingenious developers, particularly 
Jack Cotton, managed to begin rebuilding even when 
materials were rationed. After the end of rationing 
there was »an almost frightening volume of develop-
ment now going on in the city«.85 Nevertheless, in the 
1960s there were criticisms of the seemingly diffuse 
nature of the city centre’s redevelopment: »the master 
plan for the redevelopment and expansion of the civic 
area has not yet begun to take shape, and there is no 
apparent pattern in the redevelopment at the heart of 
the city«.86 Clearly there were problems in communi-
cating the aspirations of city managers to the residents 
and other stakeholders. In all, despite the criticisms 
of the planning and of the resulting development, 
Birmingham’s flexible approach, not constrained by a 
78 General Purposes Committee Minutes 21/7/1959.
79 Marriott 1967, 224.
80 Marriott 1967, 224.
81 Ginsburg 1960, 189; supported by an Editorial in the same 
issue of the Architects’ Journal, 4/2/1960.
82 Sutcliffe 1967 –1969.
83 So says McKenna 2005; Marriott 1967, 215 says £5.5 mil-
lion.
84 cf Larkham 1995.
85 Architect & Building News 1959, 474.
86 Evening Mail 8/4/1965.
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rigid plan and responsive to proposals by developers, 
was very successful in getting the city centre rebuilt 
and functioning. »Far more of the city was rebuilt 
than in other big provincial centres like Manchester, 
Liverpool and Leeds, though all faced a similarly con-
strained city centre and shortage of shops«.87
The phasing of reconstruction
From the early 1950s there was a decade of consider-
able activity, culminating in the Smallbrook Ringway 
and associated developments, many of which were 
designed by one local architect, J. A. Roberts. Despite 
the collapse of the office boom from 1964/65, activity 
continued throughout the 1960s with the ring road, 
although it was no longer closely lined with shops 
and offices along the lines of Roberts’s development. 
While construction of the central library began, the 
remainder of the civic centre failed; and the 1973 oil 
crisis and international financial problems led to work 
slowing virtually to a standstill. At much the same 
time, the rise of a conservation movement, reacting 
against the excesses and speed of the comprehensive 
redevelopments, led to a change in emphasis nation-
ally and locally. It was probably the public campaign 
against demolition of the nineteenth-century Post 
Office on Victoria Square that marked the change in 
18. City centre redevelopment (dates of building completion), 
1952 –1967
19. City centre redevelopment (dates of building completion), 
1968 – c. 1974
87 Harwood 2002, 62.
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direction of the city’s post-war development. How-
ever, the earlier reversal of policy with respect to the 
widening of Colmore Row, and hence the wholesale 
demolition of its frontage buildings, seems at least as 
significant in marking a change in culture within the 
City and at the level of central government, including 
the Listing of some buildings on this route.88
The UK’s post-war reconstruction can be seen in 
several phases.89 First, 1945 –1951, when new stat-
utory mechanisms for reconstruction and planning 
were devised. Very little was built in Birmingham 
during this period: a nurses’ home and further work 
to the C&A store, begun before the war. Birmingham 
certainly suffered from the shortages, but the situation 
was little if at all easier between 1951 and the ending 
of rationing in 1954/55; whereas one could, with Man-
zoni, argue that the origin of the city’s reconstruction 
really lay in the surveys and plans of the mid 1930s 
aimed principally at slum clearance.
The second phase is from the election of the 
Conservative government in 1951 to the end of the 
office-building boom in the mid-1960s. The economy 
was deregulated; building materials were no longer 
rationed from 1954/55, the 100% betterment levy on 
land was removed, and speculative developers forced 
the pace of change. There is broad agreement that 
the boom had ceased by 1965. This was certainly a 
period of enormous development in the city (Fig. 18). 
It became prominently featured in the national and 
international press, and remarked upon by academic 
critics throughout the post-war period, for the nature 
and extent of its redevelopment, which had probably 
a greater impact on the city’s urban form and struc-
ture than was the case in any other city even including 
London.
Although there was a slowing of developments in 
the 1960s in general, it is difficult to suggest when such 
a second period should end since some projects were 
not, or not wholly, offices; and others, including some 
very major ones such as the Central Library, were 
ongoing until the oil crisis of the early 1970s. Fig. 19 
shows developments between the start of 1968 and the 
end of 1974. Interestingly in terms of phasing, Tom 
Cowles, then the Deputy Planning Officer, claimed in 
1968 that the city was then entering a »second round 
of city planning« (Manzoni’s ring road had been the 
first), focusing on issues such as city-centre zoning, 
pedestrian movement and public transport.90
Critiques of implementation
There have been significant criticisms of the adminis-
tration of reconstruction – indeed of planning and de-
velopment generally – in post-war Birmingham. There 
was no specialist planning committee, and planning 
was split, sometimes acrimoniously, between various 
committees and officers. Those officers, especially 
Manzoni and later Sheppard Fidler, were powerful 
individuals, influential in their professions and within 
the authority. Nevertheless, whether they really fit 
within the categorisation of »the dictatorship of the 
official«91 is debatable particularly towards the end of 
Manzoni’s time in office, when the Labour group was 
more active in major planning issues. More influential 
were the committee chairmen, especially Frank Price; 
but the changing politics of the time did result in 
changes to the elected member/officer relationships. 
Ginsburg, founding Head of the Birmingham School 
of Planning, criticised the administration of recon-
struction, with planning functions dispersed amongst 
»a dozen departments« and the redevelopment section 
had »only a small staff, with less than six qualified 
town planners and not a single architect«.92
The lack of an overall plan for the city centre, 
although a deliberate approach by Manzoni with 
the agreement of the Public Works Committee, was 
clearly perceived to be a problem in some quarters. 
Ginsburg was outspoken in his criticism: the city 
should »be setting a positive example by replanning 
the properties under its leasehold control«.93 This was 
at a point where Esher later suggested that an urgent 
necessity was, »generally by hiring planning consul-
tants, to have a central area plan ready before devel-
opers’ applications put one on the spot«.94 Although 
the city could and did exercise control through its land 
ownership, the final result was less co-ordinated than 
might be desirable. Other cities, such as Nottingham, 
without overall plans were similarly criticised.95
Both proposed and actual developments had a very 
mixed press, nationally and locally; lay and profes-
88 cf Aldous 1975, 32.
89 Bullock 1997.
90 Lewis 1968.
91 Newton 1976, chapter 7.
92 Ginsburg 1959.
93 Birmingham Post 1959.
94 Esher 1981, 54 – 55.
95 Harwood 2002, 66.
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sional. The architectural critic Ian Nairn liked some 
of the civic centre proposals, but »in the rest of the 
centre proposed rebuilding is imposing at a quick 
look […] disastrously ham-handed as it appears in the 
concrete«.96 Other buildings too were visually prob-
lematic: one was »a strange elevation in four quite dif-
ferent stages, but this is not surprising since there were 
many drawing-boards involved« resulting in »New 
Street’s architectural disaster«.97 However, much of 
the impetus for the bland designs nationally at this 
time was the pressure for speedy redevelopment, and 
the speed at which decisions could be taken.98 Owen 
Luder (later RIBA President) felt that the Bull Ring 
was uninspiring, poorly related to the rest of the town 
centre, and unduly dominated by a complex road 
plan. Its basic lesson should be »that when roads and 
buildings are integrated in a three-dimensional layout 
they must be designed at the same time. To try to make 
the buildings fit afterwards as in this scheme is hardly 
likely to be very successful«.99
The ring road was criticised: »unhappily this looks 
like being the greatest traffic and town design trag-
edy yet to afflict an English city«.100 This was largely 
Manzoni’s vision, and he was described by Madin 
as pushing highways rather than a conception of 
three-dimensional planning: »basically Manzoni was 
a road engineer […] this was his limitation«.101 It was 
»essentially an engineer’s strategy, first functional and 
only incidentally as an afterthought concerned with 
aesthetics or social fabric«.102
Demolition, rebuilding and management
Buildings do, clearly, have a life cycle. This can be very 
short, even for structures not designed as temporary. 
Historically, though, infrastructure such as roads has 
tended to be considerably more resistant to change. 
Nevertheless, the natural fate of the vast majority of 
urban structures is demolition and redevelopment. In 
a case such as Birmingham’s redevelopment, where 
Manzoni felt that the buildings »should have a built-in 
redundancy, to last no more than fifteen or twenty 
years«,103 it should be no surprise that demolitions 
began only a couple of decades since construction.
However, as some contemporary architects saw 
the bombing as an opportunity, so can the demolition 
of the reconstruction-era buildings be seen today. 
There is, it is suggested, a »constructive value of 
destruction«, a »creative demolition«.104 Architects 
have been equally dogmatic: Le Corbusier said that 
»we must pull things down and throw the corpses 
onto the garbage heap«.105 Buildings praised when 
first constructed, and those subsequently given the 
accolade of protection through Listing, have been 
threatened with demolition or actually demolished. 
The principal losses have been the Bull Ring, replaced 
by a new retail mall whose design has allowed the 
reinstatement of the direct pedestrian link between 
High Street and Digbeth. Madin’s AEU Building has 
been replaced by the city’s tallest tower block, and 
his Library, NatWest Bank and Post & Mail building 
have gone too. The Rotunda was threatened in early 
schemes for the Bull Ring redevelopment, but was 
reprieved and Listed; nevertheless it has been gutted, 
converted to apartments and reclad (Fig. 20), and per-
haps more intrusive, a support for the new Bullring 
shopping centre has been driven through the podium 
block. Most strikingly, the Masshouse Circus raised 
ring road section has been demolished: removing the 
›concrete collar‹ to facilitate the regeneration of the 
east side of the city centre.
The appearance of the reconstruction-era commer-
cial areas of the city is now changing fast. Refurbish-
ment and recladding, regeneration and redevelopment 
are all having a cumulative effect. The crisp geometry 
of the reconstruction Modernism is being changed. At 
the scale of the city, one should expect this process, 
scale and rapidity of urban change. At the more local 
level, change is often resisted, and feared, by local 
communities. Continued incremental change can alter 
the character and appearance of areas to a consider-
able extent: some areas need change; in other cases, 
it is hard to resist the suggestion that this is virtually 
change for the sake of change. In Birmingham, though, 
96 Nairn 1960, 114.
97 Pevsner/Wedgwood 1966, 126; Foster 2005, 111.
98 Rose 1985, 150 –153.
99 Luder 1964, 401.
100 Ginsburg 1959; Birmingham Post 1959
101 Sutcliffe 1967 –1969.
102 Aldous 1975, 26.
103 McKenna 2005, 127, no sources given.
104 Schwarz 1931; Colby 1964, 54.
105 Le Corbusier 1967, 96.
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longevity was not a major consideration, some of the 
technologies were experimental, and short building 
life was anticipated. Nevertheless, this is a crucial pe-
riod in understanding how British cities repositioned 
themselves in a changing urban hierarchy, economy 
and socio-political milieu of the post-war future. It 
is, therefore, appropriate that the built form should 
be assessed at a point when it becoming increasingly 
subject to alteration or demolition. Not only should it 
be recorded, but its significance needs to be appraised 
in order that management decisions can be taken at 
the micro and meso scales: from buildings to urban 
quarters. In terms of management, what was good 
from this period? How might it be retained in the 
changing city? What lessons can be learned? This 
historical reassessment can make a contribution to 
the management process. There are conflicts between 
valuing the heritage of the (largely Modernist) recon-
struction era and the pressures for contemporary ur-
ban regeneration and renaissance106 that merit further 
consideration as cities change.
Abstract
The problems and opportunities of post-war recon-
struction in the UK are well demonstrated by the city 
of Birmingham, although what happened there is 
hardly typical of the country overall. The city was badly 
bombed, although damage was diffuse. Unusually, no 
formal ›reconstruction plan‹ was produced because city 
managers distrusted ›big plans‹, and because there were 
existing slum clearance plans and ring road aspirations. 
A new ring road and precinct developments dominated 
the rebuilt city centre, though the development process 
was slow and generated very mixed public responses. 
The architectural and urban forms created were also 
mixed, but concrete and brutalism reshaped the city’s 
image. Some of the buildings have not lasted well and 
were redeveloped after relatively short lives, and the 
technocentric, car-dominated approach has also failed, 
with sections of ring road also being redeveloped. 
This paper demonstrates that even a determined, sin-
gle-minded approach to reconstruction takes decades to 
implement; and that changes in fashion and society may 
very quickly render that reconstruction obsolete.
20. The Rotunda, stripped for refurbishment, 2006 (more 
standard reconstruction-period building to left) 106 While 2006; Larkham/Adams 2016.
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